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TIIE STATE OF NEW YORK 
SUPREME COURT: COUNTY Of ALBANY 
In the Matter of the Application of 
LEONARDOoDELACRUZ, #94-A-2517, 
Petitioner, 
-against-
BRION D.TRA VIS, Chairman, New York State Division 
of Parole, 
Respondent. 
For a Judgment pursuant to Article 78 
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules. 
Index #5557-03 
RJI #Ol-03-ST3901 
Decision, Order and 
Judgment 
(Supreme Court, Albany County, Special Term, November 21, 2003) 
(Justice Edward A. Sheridan, Presiding) 
APPEARANCES: 
SHERIDAN, J.: 
LEONARDO DELACRUZ, Prose 
Mid Orange Correctional Facility 
900 Kings Highway 
Warwick, New York 10990-0900 
HON. ELIOT SPITZER 
Attorney General of the State ofNew York 
(Megan M. Brown, of Cow1sel) 
Attorney for Respondent 
The Capitol 
Albany, New York 12224 
Petitioner, an inmate at Mid Orange Correctional Fa~_ility, 'brings this special 
pro~eding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR, seeking review of respondent's denial of his 
application for parole following his initial appearance before a panel of the Board of Parole. 
Petitioner is serving a controlling !~t;nl, pf tento twenty years for his conviction, upon .. . .. ······· 
a verdict, of attempted murder in the second degree, concurrent to two terms of five to ten years for 
convictions for assault in the first degree and criminal possession of a weapon in the second degree. 
MIO DELACRUZ v TRAVIS INDEX #5557-03 
All three convictions and sentences arise from the same incident on June 3, 1993, when petitioner 
and two others went in search of a fourth man who had sold them a substantial quantity of bogus 
cocaine. Petitioner was the driver of the vehicle in which they rode, and when petitioner saw the 
victim, he instructed ariother man in the car to kill the victim. Petitioner's accomplice shot the 
victim numerous times, causing gunshots wounds to his legs and arm. Petitioner was on probation 
supervision at the time of the instant offense upon a felony conviction for a gambling related offense . 
. Petitioner also had a prior misdemeanor conviction for petit larceny, for which he successfully 
r completed a term of probation. 
Petitioner came before the Parole Board for his initial interview on March I 9, 2003. 
He appears to have taken every advantage of rehabilitative opportunities while incarcerated. Indeed, 
at bis interview, one of the commissioners stated "since you've been in prison obviously you've done 
about every program I think they have ... The list is practically the entire page here, single ~ced, 
of every kind of program.:'. Y~u obviously have taken all the anger management and the programs 
for aggressive behavior ... we could go on with the list but there's every imaginable kind of program 
here that's been available to you you've taken?" 
During his hearing, petitioner answered questions relating to the instant crime, his 
. . 
prior convictions, and his prior drug use. It was noted that petitioner had received an honorable 
discharge from the U.S. Marines. As no~ed above, his thorough record of institutional programming 
was acknowledged, as was his positive disciplinary record during the duration of his incarceration 
(one tier two ticket with no keep-lock). Petitioner discussed his Christianity, to which he had 
committed himself while incarcerated. The lead cominissioner stated "[y]ou've been a very good 
inmate, behaved yourself, done all the things you were expected to do." Petitioner's plans to reside 
2 
MIO DELACRUZ v TRAVIS INDEX #5557-03 
with his mother upon release were discussed, as was his relationship with his wife and children. 
Petitioner's file contains a letter of reasonable assurance of employment from Associated 
Communications Services in W~odhaven, New York, offering petitioner a position as a trainee in 
the telecomttJ.unications field. 
Denyl.ng parole release, the Board stated: 
You are currently serving 10-20 years for attempted murder 2nd and 
5-10 years each concurrent for assault 151 and CPW 2nd. You were 
involved in large scale drug sales in the community and you and your 
accomplise [fil£J went looking for the person who supplied you bogus 
drugs. When foWld, yo.u instructed your partner to "kill him". 
Whereupon he shot the victim several times in the legs and arm. You 
demonstrated utter ~egard for the life and safety of another. You 
acknowledged yqu .were involved in large scale drug sales ?Dd were 
wider probation siipeivision for gambling. You are not a good 
candidate for discre~~nary release at this time. 
Petitioner was ordered held for 24 fIT~nths. The petition alleges tha~ bis administrative appeal w~ · 
undecided, but the decision to d~y ~~ole was administratively affirmed on September 2, 2003, 
• • ~!... • •• '.",:: • • 
shortly after this judicial proceedlni:W~- commenced. 
Petitioner assertS fou'r =Ca.us~ of action: (1) that respondent's determination was 
arbitrary and capricious; (2) that petitioner was denied constitutional ·equal protection inasmuch as 
other inmates similarly situated to him have been granted parole release; (3) that he was denied 
constitutional due process and respondent's determination was arbitrary and capricious because 
political pressure and public opinion entered into its decision making process, specifically that, 
contrary to law, the B.oaro denied him parole release because it was adhering to an Executive policy 
initiati_ve to curtail parole for violent felons; and ( 4) that respondent failed to provide a rational 
explanation why ·petitioner's positive institutional reeord was outweighed by his criminal history. 
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Respondent answers that the denial of parole and the 24 month hold was based on a hearing and 
review of petitioner's file that was conducted in accor~ance with all statutory, constitutional and 
I 
regulatory requirements, and #lat the determination must therefore ~e affirmed. Respondent 
particularly asserts that respondent may properly place heavy emphasis upon petitioner's crimes. 
Turning briefly to petitiq,J'.ler' s claim of a constitutional equal protection violation, a 
cause of action is not stated because the allegation that other inmates with prior criminal histories 
who committed homicide or violent felonies have been granted parole release is insufficient to 
establish "(I) that [h~ ], compared with otliers similarly situated, was selectively treated; and (2) that 
such selective treatment was based on'irr,ipermissible consider~tions such as race, religion, intent to 
i; • 
inhibit cir punish the exercise of ~titutiorial right,s, or malicious or bad faith intent to injure a 
;,. .... :· .:. . 
· person" c4clair ~. Saunders, 627 F2~'.~o6~ 609-610, cert. denied, 450 US 959). 
. ~ · ~.... ,:' ···. ~·,·~~ .. ' '. . . 
/ / . · · Petitioner's first and ibWtP ~a;lis~ of action-that respondent's denial of parole was 
~~:~ - . . :;· ~~: : ,-.: . . . . 
arbitrary and ·capricious and that its d:e9i~ion w~ inadequate - are, in this case, intertwined. . . . ·... . 
. ... 
In guidance of the B?.~d's stibstantial . discretionary parole release powers, the 
. ·-: .. . :. 
Executive Law provides: 
Discretionary release on parole shall not be granted merely as a 
reward for good coo.duct or efficient performance of duties while 
confined but after considering if there is a reasonable probability that, 
if such inmate is released, he will live and remain at liberty without 
violatillg the law, and that his release is n.ot incompatible with the 
welfare of society and will not so deprecate the seriousness of his ..; · 
crime as to undermine respect for law. 
(Executive Law §259-i[2][c][A]). Within these general statutory guideposts, the Parole Board has 
wide discretion in deciding whether 'C1rnot to-grant paro1e telease. "So long as the Board violates 
no positive statutory requireme~t, its discretion is absolute and beyond ~eviewin the Courts" (Matter 
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of Briguglio v Board of Parole, 24 NY2d 21, 29, quoting Matter of Hines v State Board of Parole, 
293 NY 254, 257). The discretionary detennination of the Parole Board, if made in accordance with 
q . • 
the statutes, will not be distur~ed absent a showing of error or irrationality bordering on impropriety 
(see Matter of Silmon v Travis, 95 NY2d 470; Matter of Saunders v Travis, 238 AD2d 688, J.y 
denied 90 N.Y2d 805, citing Matter of Russo v N.Y.S. Bd. of Parole, 50 NY2d 69, 77; Matter of 
Ristau v Hammock, 103 AD2d 944, lv denied,: 63 NY2d ?08), 1 
As relevant to the instant petition, Executive Law §259-i(2)( c )(A) requires the Board 
to consider: 
(i) · the institutional record fucludllig program goals and 
13:ccomplishments, academic achievements, vocational education, 
ttruning or work assignments,. therapy and interpersonal relationships 
. Wiµi staff and inmates; (ii) pe~91mance, if any, as a participant in a 
· .' · temporary release program; (ii~) ,release plans including community 
·. : ·:~ re~oi.irces, employment, educ;atiolr and training and support services 
· · · ayailable to the inmate * · * *. .' 
... . . 
Additionaily,: :Wb~}~: as here, the sentencing co~ ·~ot the Board, has set the minimum tenn 
of imprisonment; hie. B.oard must also consider: 
(i) the seriousness of the.offense with due consideration to the type of 
sentence, length of sentence and recommendations of the sentencing 
court, the district attorney, the attorney for the inmate, the pre-
sentence probation report as well as consideration of any mitigating 
and aggravating factors, and activities following arrest and prior to 
confinement; and (ii) prior criminal record, including the nature and 
pattern of offenses, ~djustment. to any previous probation or parole 
• 
1 The point made by petition~r in hjs reply submission - that respondent misstates that 
judicial review of a Parole Board decision may be foreclosed (see Brown Affirmation, 1 13) -. is 
well founded. Clearly, judicial review upon a petition pursuant to Article 78 must be conducted 
~o evaluate whether a determinati'c:ifioy The Boara fs rationally based. Silmor:i and like ca5es state 
the propositioil'thatjudicial intervention (i.e. annulment or vacatur of the Board's decision) is 
foreclosed following review that fails to reveal irrationality bordering pn impropriety. 
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supervision and institutional confinement 
(Executive Law §259-i[2][c][A]; Executive Law §259-i[l][a]). Finally, it is required when parole 
release is denied " ... the inm~te shall be informed in writing ... of the factors and reasons for such 
denial of parole ... " and that "[ s ]uch reasons shall be given in detail and not in .conclusory terms." 
(Executive Law §259.:.i[2][a][i]). 
It is true that when deciding a parole release application, the Board must consider the 
circumstances, nature and seriousness of an inmate's offense( s) (see, Matter of Geames v Travis, 284 
AD2d 84 3, appeal dismissed 97 NY2d 63 9). The weight to be accorded the various statutory factors : 
is generally within the Bo.atd's broad discretiopCMatterof.Tohnson vTravis,284 AD2d 686). While 
in its detei:mination ~e ~oard need not expressly discuss each statutory factor, it must provide the 
inmate with a proper hearing and consider only the statutoriiy defined criteria (Matter of King v New 
· : r· . \,. 
York State Div. Of J?ar~le;, 8-} NY2d 788, 791). It has been said that in applying the statutory 
" 
guideli.t;tes to the circuk~ces of an inmate's case in the ex;ercise of a sound discretion, the Board 
pert:orms a classicaiJ~ jl!ai~ial task (Tarter v State ofNew York, 68 NY2d 511, 517-19). 
But the Board's reliance on petitioner's instant offense is not beyond all review. 
While the Board may place heavy emphasis upon the serious nature of petitioner's crimes (see 
Matter of Angel v Travis, 1 AD3d 859; Matter of Bramble v New York State Board of Parole, 307 
AD2d 463; Matter ofLue-Shin.g v Pataki 301 AD2d 827, Iv denied 99 NY~d 511,citing, Matter of 
Henderson v New York State Div. of Parole, 295 AD2d 678, 679; Matter of Killeen v Travis, 291 
AD2d 600, 600-601; Matter of Collado v. New York State Div. of Parole, 287 AD2d 921), it is 
improper for the Board to conclude, as it did here, that the circumstances of petitioner's inStant 
offense was the exclusive basis upon which to base a denial of parole. Executive Law §259-
6 
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i(2)( c )(A) expressly requires the Board to consider whether petitioner would "live and remain at 
liberty without vio.lating the law, and that his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society 
and will not so tleprecate the seriousness of his crime as ·to undermine respect for law." The record 
of the in~tant proceeding, most particularly the stated reasons for denial, do not include any 
indication that the Board considered these statutorily directed rationales when deciding petitioner's 
application for parole release. 
As this Court has previously stated (see Matter of Chan v Travis, Supreme Court, 
Albany County, 2/7 /03), this State's penolegical and sentencing scheme provides that the sentencing· 
judge sets the minimum and .maximum te~ of an indeterminate sentence within legislative 
prescriptions, presumptivdy'ref'Jecting the judge's view of what minimally and maximally would . • ' .. .. 
'• 
satisfy the ends of justice gi\"eP all-the facts and circumstances of the particular case. Generally, the 
minimum aspect of an indete~~e sentence reflects an acceptable period of confinement ~d 
' • I ·.'·" , • 
punishment in the event of sa~~~~~~ry rehabilitation, while the maximum imposed represents the 
lawful period of incarceratio~ ahie~t" satisfactory institutional adjustment and rehabilitative effort. . . 
The Board of Parole then determines the maximum expiration or release date of an indeterminate 
sentence within that judicially imposed range and in accordance with statutory guidelines for the 
exercise of its quasi-judicial function. 
On this record, the Board's decision lacks the detail of factors and reasons required 
by Executive Law §259-i(2)(a)(i). The decision recites only the facts' relating to petitioner's instant 
crime, and nothing else. Petitioner's exemplary institutional record of programming achievements 
' and discipl~ary compliance exemplifies the "st.i:ong-rehabilitative component" (Matter of Salmon 
v Travis, 95 NY2d 470, 477) underlying the statutory scheme and inherent in an indeterminate 
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sentencing Structure. To hold that the Board's statement of the factors and reasons for denial in this 
case is sufficient would condone the Board's apparent disregard of the rehabilitative component, 
contrary to the yery purpose of the indeterminate sentencing and parole statutes. 
Overarching this case are the contentions underlying petitioner's third cause of action 
-· that the Parole Board is following an Executive policy initiative to curtail parole for all violent 
felons. This Court need not restate the public record facts that underlie that allegation (see Chan v 
Travis, supra, at 10-11 ), and it is not necessary to further discuss in this matter whether the Board 
is de facto implementing Executive policy qy curtailing parole for violent felons. Here, the decision· 
to deny parole was arbitrary and capti~i~_us because it was apparently based exclusively upon the . . .., . 
facts of petitioner's crime and without 9~e regard for the statutory criteria requir~ to be considered 
' . 
: ' ... . . . , 
by Executive Law §259-i(2)(c)(A). _,~4cP,rdingly, and for all of the foregoing reasons, it is 
. :t ·.~ 
ORDERED, that the p~¥l.on is GRANTED, the detennination denying parole is ... \ .. . ·::: .. ·_:~{ . 
annulled, and the matter is remanded: ,tO the Board of Parole for a prompt re-hearing before a new 
. · --~ . ·· .. .. .. 
panel and a decision not inconsistent w~~r(this Court's decision. 
This memorandum shall cop.stitute the Decision, Order and Judgment of this Court. 
All papers including the original of this Decision are bei.ng sent to respondent's attorney. The 
signing of this Decision does not constitute entry or filing. Respondent's attorney shall comply with 
the applicable provisions of the C,PLR respecting filing, entry and notice of entry. 
SO ORDERED. 
ENTER JUDGMENT. 
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Dated: Albany, New York 
January ?J-C/ , 2004 
PAPERS CONSIDERED: 
(1) Order to Show Cause, signed September 5, 2003; 
(2) Verified Petition., sworn to August i l ,' 2003, with exhibits 1-31; 
(~)Petitioner's Notice to Admit, dated August 21, 2003; 
(4) Verified Answer, dated November 6, 2003, with exhibits A-H; 
(5) A:ffimiation of Megan M. Brown, Esq.; dated November 6, 2003; 
(6) Respons°c to Notice to Admit, dated October 9, 2003; 
(7) Petitio~er' S Reply to Opposition, date. Noyember 17, 2003. . . .. 
··.· . 
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